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“To Get Rich Is Not Only Glorious”:




This article examines the profound transformation market reforms have
brought to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rural
grassroots organizations. Focusing on the political rise of private entrepre-
neurs and other economically successful individuals who recently obtained
village Party secretary appointments in a north China county, the article
explores their differing promotion channels, power bases, political resources
and motivations to take up the CCP’s grassroots leadership position. It
demonstrates that the variety among the new entrepreneurial Party
secretaries – from large factory owners to de facto farm managers – shaped
the network resource, factional affiliation and socio-political capital they
rely upon to exercise their newly attained power. It also shows the crucial
role played by community-based endogenous forces in transmitting the
power of economic liberalization into dynamics for the reshuffling of the
Communist Party leadership at the grassroots level.
Keywords: economic reform; political reform; rural politics; institutional
innovation; local governance
Radical social transformation – whether war, revolution, political reform,
marketization, democratization or industrialization – usually triggers major
changes in a nation’s political elites. These changes include, amongst other
things, the composition of political elites, elite recruitment, dominant ideol-
ogies and power bases, as well as the dynamic relationship between political
elites and the masses. After three decades of liberal economic reform, one of
the most fundamental political changes taking place in rural China today is
the gradual yet significant transformation of the composition, nature and
power bases of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s local leaders,
particularly reflected in the rapid rise of private entrepreneurs and other
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economically successful individuals1 into the core leadership of the Party’s
grassroots organizations.
As Robert D. Putnam noted in 1976: “‘Who rules?’ has a fair claim to be the
central question of empirical political science.”2 Drawing upon intensive fieldwork
conducted in a north China county during 2005–06, this article examines the ways
in which the new economic elites managed to enter into the CCP’s local leadership
and to replace the once-established proletariat Party secretaries. It details the cru-
cial variety among the entrepreneurial Party chiefs, and the dynamics, incentives
and motivations behind their political rise, as well as the socio-political resources
they rely upon to exercise their newly attained power. Instead of focusing on the
(important) role played by central directives and initiatives, this article demon-
strates that the endogenous dynamics generated by market forces and embedded
in the social networks within the boundary of the local community are equally cru-
cial in shaping the path and pattern of the political empowerment of the CCP’s
newly minted entrepreneurial grassroots leaders.
The study of rural elites has attracted the attention of China scholars for nearly
half a century. Be they traditional gentry, wealthy landlords or village cadres with
state-conferred revolutionary authority, local elites have for thousands of years
governed the Chinese villages. How has China’s unprecedented large-scale tran-
sition from a socialist “planned” economy towards a market system influenced
the nation’s rural political leaders? Previous studies provided substantially
different – at times opposite – views. As early as 1985, Richard Latham reported
that rural economic reforms in China not only deprived the grassroots proletariat
cadres of prestige and political advantage, but also left them at an economic dis-
advantage and imperiled their normally secure leadership positions.3 Elaborating
on similar observations, Victor Nee proposed a “theory of market transition,”
where he argues that the departure from a socialist distributive economy would
expand the incentive and opportunity structure for entrepreneurship, and the dis-
tribution of political power will gradually shift towards those who are successful
in the market rather than the social classes close to the bureaucratic distributor
1 In this article, “private entrepreneurs and other economically successful individuals” are defined as indi-
viduals who own and engage in private business successfully or professionals who own and run private
practices for profit, which can range from self-employment to larger ventures. See Kelly S. Tsai,
Capitalism without Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 11. They are the econ-
omic elites in the local communities, who share economic success in the transition to a market economy.
Throughout the article, “private entrepreneurs and other economically successful individuals” are used
interchangeably with “private business owners,” “entrepreneurial elites” or the “new economic elites.”
In Q county’s official discourse, “private entrepreneurs and other economically successful individuals”
are categorized as nengren (capable people), zhifu nengshou ( “get-rich experts”) or xin shehui jieceng
(new social stratum) to avoid possible ideological ambiguity. Also see Bruce Gilley, “The Yu Zuomin
phenomenon: entrepreneurs and politics in rural China,” in Victoria E. Bonnell and Thomas B. Gold
(eds.), The New Entrepreneurs in Europe and Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002) p. 74.
2 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1976), p. 2.
3 Richard J. Latham, “The implications of rural reforms for grass-roots cadres,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and
Christine Wong (eds.), The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1985) pp. 157–73.
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under socialism.4 In short, as Yan Yunxiang argued, economic reforms in rural
China encouraged the emergence of new elites from the more remote political
peripheries.5
These views are contradicted by Andrew Walder, who, by examining the trans-
formation of China’s post-Mao cadres, found that the shift to a market economy
has had little consequence on the bases of cadre power in the countryside. He
suggested that there is no indication that “the rural political elite are defecting
from their posts for better opportunities in the market economy” and “the private
entrepreneurs are the least likely to become cadres in any rural group.”6 Akos
Rona-Tas developed the distinction of the “erosion” of socialism and the “tran-
sition” from socialism. Based on that, he argued that although in the erosion
phase the incumbent cadres may have little or no advantage, in the transition
stage they have enormous advantage in quickly taking over the new corporate
segment of the private sector and becoming the new economic elites.7 In the
past decade, many China scholars have also documented the continuing influence
of communist cadres at all levels during China’s economic liberalization and
argued that market transition has destroyed neither the bases for local cadre
power nor the intrusive intervention of the state.8
Recent studies on political development in post-Mao China have shifted atten-
tion from this “structuralist” debate on the consequential political effects of econ-
omic liberalization to a more “voluntarist” focus on the Communist Party’s
strategic co-optation of China’s nouveaux-riches in a partially reformist context.
Various studies offered keen insights on the institutional links between the
party-state and the private sector,9 the political attitudes of different groups of
4 Victor Nee, “A theory of market transition: from redistribution to markets in state socialism,” American
Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 (1989) pp. 663–81; Victor Nee, “The emergence of a market society:
changing mechanisms of stratification in China,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 4 (1996)
pp. 908–49.
5 Yan Yunxiang, “Everyday power relations: changes in a north China village,” in Andrew G. Walder
(ed.), The Waning of the Communist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) pp. 215–39.
6 Andrew G. Walder, “The Party elite and China’s trajectory of change,” in Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and
Zheng Yongnian (eds.), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (London & New York: Routledge,
2006), p. 27.
7 Akos Rona-Tas, “The first shall be last? Entrepreneurship and communist cadres in the transition from
socialism,” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 1 (1994) pp. 40–69. For the persistent
power and dominance of communist-era institutions and elites in Eastern Europe, see also Eric
Hanley, “Cadre capitalism in Hungary and Poland: property accumulation among communist-era
elites,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2000) pp. 143–78; David Stark,
“Privatization in Hungary: from plan to market or from plan to clan,” East European Politics and
Societies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1990) pp. 351–92.
8 Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
p. 187. For the continuing influence of communist cadres and institutions during China’s market tran-
sition, also see Sally Sargeson and Jian Zhang, “Reassessing the role of the local state: a case study of
local government interventions in property rights reform in a Hangzhou district,” The China Journal,
No. 42 (1999) pp. 77–99; Gordon White, “The impact of economic reforms in the Chinese countryside:
towards the politics of social capitalism?” Modern China, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1987) p. 424; Bian Yanjie and
John R. Logan, “Market transition and the persistence of power: the changing stratification system in
urban China,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 5 (1996) pp. 739–58.
9 Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Chen Jie
and Bruce J. Dickson, “Allies of the state: democratic support and regime support among China’s
“To Get Rich Is Not Only Glorious” 337
private entrepreneurs,10 the CCP’s tactics in co-opting private entrepreneurs11
and the decline of the traditional socialist order under accelerated market trans-
formation.12 More importantly, empirical research on the CCP’s co-optation of
China’s private sector revealed the remarkable variations among the new econ-
omic elites. Drawing upon national survey data and extensive interviews,
Kellee Tsai systematically explored the crucial varieties among China’s emerging
private entrepreneurs based on their occupational backgrounds, business size and
political networks. Tsai argued in particular that “these key differences translate
into varying social and political identities, as well as varying access to resources
for resolving grievances”13 and private entrepreneurs in China do not constitute a
uniform social or class identity.14
Based on my fieldwork in Q county, this article extends these earlier studies of
the politics of China’s rising entrepreneurial elites into the rural scene. While
most existing literature focuses on the urban entrepreneurial elites’ indirect politi-
cal influence through corporatist arrangements such as business associations, pol-
itical consultative organs or ordinary CCP membership, this article examines
their rural counterparts’ decisive attainment of the key leadership positions
(such as Party secretary) within the CCP’s grassroots organizations, suggesting
a more direct and effective channel for China’s rural nouveaux-riches to exert pol-
itical influence.
The following sections map out the political rise of the economically successful
in Q county and explore the important varieties among these new local elites,
detailing their diverse business backgrounds, network resources, factional affilia-
tions and social bases, and how these variations substantially shaped their
relationship with the local party-state and subsequently their journey to political
power. The article then examines the incentive structure behind the new economic
elites’ decision to take up leadership positions within the “establishment” and the
social bases upon which they exercise political power. My findings demonstrate
that, in the reform era, while the CCP still maintains effective political control
and vast political influence over rural politics, it does proactively encourage
the adaptive transformation of its rural grassroots organs to fit into the
footnote continued
private entrepreneurs,” The China Quarterly, No. 196 (2008), pp. 780–804; Bruce Dickson, Wealth into
Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
10 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China; Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy; Chen and Dickson, “Allies of
the state”; David S. G. Goodman (ed.), The New Rich in China (London: Routledge, 2008).
11 Zheng Yongnian,Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition (London: Eastern
Universities Press, 2004); Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental
Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); David Shambaugh, China’s
Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Dickson,
Wealth into Power.
12 Walder, The Waning of the Communist State; Andrew G. Walder and Litao Zhao, “Political office and
household wealth: rural China in the Deng era,” The China Quarterly, No. 186 (2006) pp. 357–76.
13 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy.
14 Ibid.
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fast-changing socio-economic environment. However, the momentum generated
by the central party-state’s pro-business initiatives is not a sufficient mandate for
the emerging economic elites to take over the local leadership; the “complex
embroidery of forces”15 behind their political empowerment is rooted in the
structural transformation set in motion by market reforms, driven by the
party-state’s determination of contextual adaptation, and facilitated by endogen-
ous communal forces accumulated from the daily interactions between the new
elites and their fellow villagers. Each of these components – particularly the
community-based forces – is indispensable in the intricate and multifaceted
process.
Rich People Taking Over
The People’s Liberation Army took over Q county, in the eastern part of the
North China Plain, in the summer of 1947. Until the late 1980s, villages in Q
county were under the control of typical Maoist proletariat cadres. Recruited
from “among disadvantaged elements in the village,”16 these cadres were con-
ferred leadership positions based on their class rank, political performance during
the revolution and loyal service in the new republic’s various mass movements.17
By contrast, until the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s reform in the 1980s, people with
entrepreneurial skills and the capability to prosper in a free market were margin-
alized in local politics. “Wanyuan hu 万元户 (literally, the 10,000-yuan house-
hold) were extremely cautious in politics back then,” one interviewee in Q
county recalled. “They would not brag too much about their market activities
even though everyone knew how they had made their family fortune. They
usually managed to hide their wealth and to have the same appearance as the
ordinary villagers. And there was absolutely no way for them to get into village
leadership – if you were rich, you were out.”18
During the 1990s, with reforms gradually loosening the strict control of the
hukou 户口 system, many of the rural families in Q county who had prospered
in the early reform era managed to move into the larger cities while maintaining
their legal residency in the village. During this period, the nouveaux-riche house-
holds remained politically marginalized: although their lucrative economic activi-
ties were tolerated by the central party-state, their political trustworthiness and
moral standard were habitually questioned by local Party bosses and the rural
communities. Nevertheless, under economic liberalization, private business own-
ers were freed from their past socio-political status and were referred to in the
Party’s official discourse as a “new social stratum” (xin shehui jieceng 新社会
阶层).
15 Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 2.
16 John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988),
p. 8.
17 See Jonathan Unger, The Transformation of Rural China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
18 Interview no. 2005-001-001.
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At the turn of the 21st century, village leadership in Q county experienced a
major reshuffling as a consequence of both generational change and policy
shift. According to a survey conducted by the author in 2005–06,19 among the
211 incumbent village Party secretaries (cun zhishu村支书, VPS) who responded,
one-third became Party secretary during the 1990s while around 46 per cent were
appointed during the six-year interval between 2000 and 2006. Some 53 per cent
were first appointed to the VPS position after 1998.
Yet the generational transformation of local political elites is not the only
change; more importantly, the proportion of people from the new social stratum
among the appointees reached an all-time high during the past decade. The offi-
cial records of the CCP’s organization department of Q county showed that 189
people were appointed to VPS position for the first time between 1998 and 2004,
and among them 67 (35.45 per cent) came from the new social stratum, with the
percentage of such appointees peaking in 2001 and 2002 (see Figure 1). This was
probably the result of the gradual unveiling of Jiang Zemin’s “three-represents”
theory (san ge daibiao三个代表) between the spring of 2000 and summer of 2001,
which legitimized the inclusion of private entrepreneurs and other economically
successful individuals into the political system.
However, in both 2003 and 2004, this number declined. There are two possible
explanations. First, as Q county is a hinterland county with modest development
of its market economy, the supply of qualified candidates from the new social
stratum for VPS appointment was limited. Given the Party’s aggressive recruit-
ment effort for entrepreneurial VPSs since 1998, the reservoir of candidates natu-
rally shrank after the consecutive peak years. More importantly, Jiang’s
“three-represents” speech also “sparked renewed controversy” in the official dis-
course over the political qualification of private entrepreneurs. With the
re-invigorated ideological dispute and the uncertainties associated with the suc-
cession of the Hu-Wen Administration in 2002, it is understandable that local
Table 1: When Were You First Appointed Village Party Secretary?








No response 7 3.32
Totals 211 100
Source:
Questionnaire survey of village leaders in Q county; see Appendix.
19 See Appendix.
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cadres opted to take a more politically cautious stance.20 Despite these uncertain-
ties and ambiguities, the local party-state remained firm in recruiting more entre-
preneurial VPSs. In a speech given at a county-level cadre conference in 2005, the
Party secretary of Q county re-emphasized that “it is crucial for us to continue
absorbing capable leaders from the new social stratum to consolidate the
Party’s grassroots leadership under deepened market reforms. And that remains
the top priority for the Party’s organizational work.”21
The occupations of these entrepreneurial appointees range from private busi-
nessmen and de facto farm owners to successful professionals operating private
practices. Figure 2 shows the detailed occupational breakdown of all incumbent
VPSs appointed since 1998 in Q county. Among these recent appointees, small
business owners and private farm owners constituted a remarkably high pro-
portion. Next were the independent professionals such as medical doctors and
professional drivers. The proportion of proletariat cadres among the newly
appointed VPSs reached an all-time low.
This is hardly accidental: since the 1990s, selecting candidates with an entrepre-
neurial background for the CCP’s local leadership vacancies has become a
Figure 1:Members of the New Social Stratum in the NewAppointments of Village
Party Secretaries in Q County
Source:
Survey of village leaders in Q county; see Appendix.
20 For the “three-represents” theory, see Bruce J. Dickson, “Dilemmas of party adaptation,” in Peter Hays
Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and Society in 21st-century China (New York & London:
Routledge, 2004), pp. 141–58; Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, pp. 60–66; for the renewed contro-
versy over co-opting private entrepreneurs after the “three represents” speech, see Dickson, Red
Capitalists in China, pp. 98–107; Dickson, Wealth into Power, pp. 70–79.
21 The author’s notes taken at the Q county Cadre Conference on the Development of Rural Economic
Co-operatives, September 2005, no. 2005-020-2.
“To Get Rich Is Not Only Glorious” 341
guiding rationale for the Party’s organizational work in Q county. As one Party
official described:
In Q County, we have to let those who know how to win in the marketplace lead the grassroots
organizations [of the CCP]. Otherwise, they will not be able to attract and unite the villagers
under the flag of the Chinese Communist Party; and if so, these appointments would have
been unconvincing.22
The appointment of people with business success into the Communist Party’s
key local leadership posts is not peculiar to Q county. For example, Xiangzhen
luntan 乡镇论坛, a widely read policy journal edited by the Ministry of Civil
Affairs, reported in 2004 that in Zhejiang province alone, 30 per cent of the
newly appointed VPSs belong to the so-called “newly rich” group (xianfu qunti
先富群体). In places where the private sector is the government’s primary revenue
source, this percentage can be as high as 60–65.23 Even in the underdeveloped
inland regions – as an internal Party journal reported in 2006 – 60 out of the
total of 148 villages in Hejin city (a county-level city) in Shanxi province have
private business owners as either the VPS or the director of the village committee
Figure 2: Occupational Break-down of the New Entrepreneurial VPSs
Source:
Official Statistics of the Department of Organization, Q county.
22 Interview with township Party secretaries (no. 2005-002-001).
23 Huang Feng, “Zhejiang cunguan you sancheng shi furen” (“About one-third of Zhejiang’s village lea-
ders are rich people”), Xiangzhen luntan (Township Forum), No. 5 (2005), p. 12.; Gu Zhengxi, “Woguo
nongcun xianfu qunti canzheng de jili jiegou ji guifan zhidao” (“The incentive structure and regulation
of our nation’s new rich people’s participation in politics”), Tansuo (The Inquiry), No. 1 (2004), pp. 38–
41; Wang Zengjie, “Nongcun fu’er weiguan xianxiang toushi” (“An analysis of the ‘rich people serving
in public offices’ phenomenon in the rural areas”), Zhonggong Urumuqi shiwei dangxiao xuebao (The
Academic Gazetteer of the Party School of Urumuqi Committee of the CCP), No. 6 (2002), p. 16.
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(cunweihui zhuren村委会主任).24 In a 2003 editorial, Lingdao juece xinxi领导决
策信息, also an internal Party publication, explicitly demanded the full “protec-
tion of the emerging trend of electing rich people [to leadership positions] at the
village level.”25 In the same year, an article published in a journal belonging to
the agricultural department of Jiangsu province acclaimed an official slogan
that bluntly suggested: “If you do not have the ability to make yourself rich,
there is NO village leadership position for you!” (meiyou zhifuzhao buneng
dang cunguan 没有致富招, 不能当村官!).26
The New Entrepreneurial Party Secretaries
If the political rise of entrepreneurial VPS in the rural political scene is such an
influential trend in rural China, it is worth exploring the politics associated
with this new group of rural leaders. How are they selected? What is their
relationship with the supervising township and county level communist cadres?
How do they manage to attain the key leadership posts?
In Q county, the appointment of the VPS has remained a political decision
made from above. After all, the village Party committee is an integral component
of the CCP’s tightly controlled “democratic centralist” apparatus, rather than an
autonomous organization of self-government. The selection of VPS is operated
exclusively by local Party bosses27 at the township level. Although in economi-
cally or politically influential villages the county-level Party committee intervenes
from time to time, in most other cases the power of selecting the VPS is exercised
at the sole discretion of the supervising township-level communist secretaries.
From the early 21st century, thanks to the central government’s call for
“transparency in village governance” (cunwu gongkai 村务公开), this traditional
selection process began to involve more public consultation and electoral ingre-
dients. In a different way from the more direct “two ballot system”28
implemented in other parts of China, Q county links the selection of VPS with
the election of the village representative assembly (the village council). Under
this institutional arrangement, to be appointed or re-appointed as VPS a candi-
date must win a seat in the elected village council of his or her native village, and
24 Pan Qisheng, “Toushi fuhao cunguan xianxiang” (“An analysis of the ‘millionaire village leader’ phe-
nomeon”), Lingdao zhiyou (Friend of the Leaders), No. 3 (2006), p. 28.
25 “Cunmin xuanju de furen hua xiang yao yifa baohu” (“On the tendency of electing rich people in village
elections and the legal protection of them”), Lingdao juece xinxi (Leaders and Decision Making), No. 39
(2003), p. 24.
26 Ma Hongyan, “Meiyou zhifuzhao, buneng dang cunguan” (“No ability to make yourself rich, no village
leadership position (for you)!”), Jiangsu nongcun jingji (Rural Economy of Jiangsu), No. 4 (2003), p. 41.
It is worth noting that the author of the article was from the CCP’s central newspaper Peasant Daily
(Nongmin ribao).
27 These “local Party bosses” usually include the secretary, deputy secretaries and members of the town-
ship Party committee, of whom the secretary and deputy secretary in charge of personnel affairs have the
most important say.
28 Li Lianjiang, “The two-ballot system in Shanxi province: subjecting village Party secretaries to a pop-
ular vote,” The China Journal, No. 42 (1999), pp. 103–18.
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any incumbent VPS who loses that election will be removed from office.29 Hence
mechanisms of public consultation and popular approval – albeit quite limited –
are introduced into the otherwise secretive VPS selection process. In Q county,
the selection of VPS is run by the supervising Party committee at the township
level, controlled by individual Party bosses, but it still involves veto power held
by the common villagers via ballots in village council elections. In short, both the
Party’s endorsement and community recognition are decisive for VPS appointment.
After appointment, the relationship between the VPS and the supervising Party
bosses at the township level becomes somewhat complicated. On the one hand,
the township leaders usually allow the newly appointed entrepreneurial VPS con-
siderable autonomy because of their fundamental agreement in the goal of econ-
omic development. On the other hand, the township bosses still strive to maintain
their traditional influence and rigid control over the political activities of the new
VPS through various formal or informal mechanisms, including an annual VPS
performance review, distribution of construction funds, allocation of scarce
resources (such as the quota for People’s Liberation Army’s recruitment) or
even the issuance of administrative permits. The township Party secretaries retain
an important role when a complaint or impeachment is launched by the villagers
against an incumbent entrepreneurial VPS. Usually an investigation will be
ordered and the fate of the VPS will be decided at the absolute discretion of
the township Party bosses; in extreme cases where the VPS is deemed by his or
her supervisors unable or unsuitable to continue the job, a work group (gongzuo
zu 工作组) will be dispatched to take over the duties of the entire village Party
committee until the issue has been solved.
More importantly, the journey to political power of individual members of the
new economic elite is shaped by the disparate nature of their private businesses
and practices, as well as the diverse network resources, factional affiliations,
social bases and experiences they possess. In Q county, six major categories of
such elite-turned-VPS can be identified.
Owners of large outside businesses
Typical entrepreneur-cadres under this category own a relatively large private
business in a major city like Beijing and Tianjin but maintain legal residency
29 According to Q county’s “Regulations on the work of village organizations,” “Party secretaries who fail
in village-level democratic elections and are not elected to the village council or village administrative
committee shall resign from post.” In the first village council election in 2001, only 85.4% of the incum-
bent VPSs in Q county won a seat and those who failed were immediately removed from office. In the
second council election in 2006, the passing rate increased to 92.8%. See Zhonggong Q xian xianwei
bangongshi (The General Office of the Party Committee of Q County), Qingxian cunzhi moshi ziliao
huibian (Collection of Materials on the Village Governance Model in Q County), 2005, p. 73; Zhong
gong Q xian xianwei zuzhibu (The Organization Department of the Party Committee of Q County),
Quan xian di qi jie cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju gongzuo Q kuang tongji biao (Statistical Form
on the Seventh Re-election of Village Organizations in Q County), 2006; Yan Xiaojun, “The democratiz-
ing power of economic reform: revival of a representative institution in rural China,” Problems of Post-
Communism, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2011), pp. 39–52.
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in their native village. Geographical distance spares them the necessity of build-
ing a patronage relationship with either the villagers or the local government;
however, business success outside their native place ensures they are well
known among the locals, especially within their extended lineages. The mere
fact of being a rich businessperson allows – if not obliges – them to make regular
monetary and non-monetary contributions to the community and – as an inevi-
table consequence – be consulted on public affairs. Their private factory in a
major city provides jobs and shelter for fellow villagers who look for opportu-
nities in the metropolises. Entrepreneurs of this category are usually invited by
the township Party committee to move back and serve as VPS, anticipating
that they would help develop the local economy and improve public services.30
They have only minimum connections with the local party-state apparatus
other than the agreement on developmental goals; their power base is more or
less built upon the trust and expectation of the local community.31
Local business owners with lineage seniority
The second category of entrepreneur-cadres includes those who own and success-
fully run private enterprises within their native village. In Q county, most of these
local entrepreneurs possess senior status in the village’s lineage networks and
have a certain level of moral authority given their combination of wealth and
lineage seniority. Many serve as zongli总理32 for one or a few extended lineages.
Although their enterprises are located locally, they do not have to rely on the
patronage provided by political authorities because their factories usually have
high mobility and can easily be relocated to other places if the local business
environment fails to meet their expectations. Also, their profitable enterprises
supply the village communities with employment opportunities, cash donations
and other economic welfare. Business success, moral authority and lineage
seniority together serve as their solid – if not unshakable – political bases.
Local professionals
Some new VPSs are professionals, such as village doctors or professional drivers,
who operate private practices for profit locally and get rich because of their
knowledge or special skills. They live in their native village and provide essential
services for the village community. Given the nature of their business, these
30 After accepting their appointment, these VPSs will move back to their local community to resume
responsibility. Some will bring family members, while others leave their family in the cities and travel
back and forth. Because of the close distance between Q county and major cities like Beijing or
Tianjin, some such entrepreneurs choose to attend their businesses for two days a week and spent the
rest of the week in their village.
31 Interview with the deputy Party secretary of M township (no. 2005-007-001).
32 In Q county, zongli is responsible for arranging weddings and funerals for members of his/her lineage(s).
Zongli’s help is necessary for these important life events and ordinary families just cannot afford to
destroy the relationship with their zongli. Zonglis are very authoritative figures in the local community.
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professionals usually keep a natural distance from the supervising party-state
apparatus but maintain remarkably close socio-economic ties with their native
community – as their economic success relies less on the patronage of the
Party bosses than on the trust and loyalty of their customers. Their long-term ser-
vice to the community usually bestows on them a highly respected reputation as a
benign care-taker and service-provider, which constitutes a community-based
foundation for political promotion.
De facto private farm owners
Private farm owners run large-scale agricultural industry on leased land.33
Agricultural commercialization requires these emerging “agricultural capitalists”
to maintain an extremely close relationship with the village government and the
local community where their business operates. Their success relies on the collab-
oration of individual households (who act as the de facto landlords), village gov-
ernments (who possess legal ownership and issue permits) and the local
party-state (who grants legality to the lease). Private farm owners usually enjoy
a very cooperative relationship with the hosting village as they pay a decent
rent, provide job opportunities and offer donations to public welfare. For the
township government, organic agriculture based on private farming has become
another rising industry that provides additional tax revenues and helps economic
development. Both communal support and the blessings of the party-state can
eventually become a joint force that pushes these “agricultural capitalists” to
become VPSs.
Former marginal cadres
Other entrepreneurial cadres have a dual identity: former marginal village cadres
and current private business owners. They are mostly demobilized soldiers who
ascend to VPS position based on their business success and past experiences in
public service. Having managed to join the CCP during their military service,
these former soldiers are usually appointed to marginal positions in the village
government after demobilization. During the 1990s, many of them made good
use of the special skills they obtained in the army (like driving or mechanic man-
ufacturing) and started their own businesses. Their success relies heavily on the
patronage provided by the politically powerful, and their career paths are shaped
by close ties with the local Party establishment. They win in the competition for
33 In Q county, as in other regions of China, farm land is collectively owned by the village committee and is
not considered private property. Under the Household Responsibility System, rural households possess
the right of use over their shares of collective farm land. However, in the 1990s, because of the excessive
levies and fees charged on agriculture, many rural households decided to lease out their right of use. The
land was taken over by private entrepreneurs who wanted to develop large-scale organic agricultural
businesses. After a decade, in many villages these agricultural entrepreneurs now control a large portion
of the farm land by lease and have become de facto farm owners.
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the top village leadership job usually because of their dual qualifications: political
trustworthiness in the eyes of the Party bosses and attractive business success in
the eyes of the people.
Communal entrepreneurs
Communal entrepreneurs are often selected as VPS in villages suffering from
feuds or lineage conflicts. They usually emerge as influential community leaders
in mediating internal fights among rival factions, lineages or ethnic groups. Their
ability to settle internal disputes is drawn from their well-developed organiz-
ational skills, financial ability and connections with members of rival groups
through employment, patronage or kinship. In more divided villages, the local
party-state is more likely to select a VPS who can stand between the rivals, med-
iate conflicts in a sophisticated way and play a conciliatory role in daily politics;
or, as one interviewee put it, communal entrepreneurs are selected because they
“can glue the divided communities together.”34
Political Capital
Seen as representatives of the dregs of capitalism, private business/practice own-
ers in China had been on the losing side of the Maoist revolution, repeatedly
becoming the usual victims of collective hatred and harsh state terror.
Economic liberalization from the 1980s not only facilitated business activities
but also brought back private business owners into the nation’s normal political
life. In 2002, the 16th CCP National Conference finally allowed private business
owners to join the Communist Party, which officially exorcised the Leninist
orthodoxy on the proletariat nature of communist parties and bestowed political
blessings upon China’s fledging economic elites.
Nevertheless, at the local level central directives are far from a sufficient man-
date for the entrepreneurial elites to attain tangible political power. At the lowest
level of the Chinese polity, the reincarnation of China’s business owners as a
major political force does not come automatically at the will of the central
party-state; it involves complex social and political processes within the local
communities, where private entrepreneurs manage to transmit their business suc-
cess, personal wealth and the momentum from high above into real prestige and
power on the ground. In Q county, this process mainly comprises three com-
ponents: philanthropic activities, activism in community services and business
collaboration with political authorities. By engaging in these activities, the econ-
omically successful spend their cash “wisely” in exchange for communal trust,
governmental recognition and eventually political appointment.
34 Interview in G village ( no. 2005-009-001).
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Philanthropic activities
China’s rural economic elites are deeply rooted in their native communities and
embedded in the endogenous village networks.35 Based on the “localism” moral-
ity36 prevailing in rural China, they take the general welfare and collective inter-
est of their village community seriously. By sponsoring local philanthropic
activities, they can project an image as “dedicated and unselfish” benefactors
of the village, remove the moral scepticism surrounding them, and eventually
harvest trust, support and approval from the community.
In Q county, affluent business families played a crucial role in a disparate array
of village public construction projects by providing monetary support and leader-
ship. Individual entrepreneurs helped to obtain the best bargains for construction
materials; or when the budget was limited, they would offer shipping subsidies.
They also granted paid leave for villagers working in their enterprises who
were drafted for corvée labour in public projects. Direct donations to social wel-
fare programmes – such as the provision of school dormitories, tuition or medical
assistance – is also an important channel through which local entrepreneurs
deliver service and obtain support.37 Given the insufficient financial support
from the central government, local entrepreneurs’ participation has become
increasingly crucial in village-level public projects since the abolishment of the
national agricultural tax in the early 21st century.38
“Noblesse oblige” based community activism
Making a family fortune ( fa jia发家) is the dream of every Chinese rural house-
hold. Being the fortunate early batch of the newly rich under market reforms, the
entrepreneurial elites in Q county feel not only capable but also obliged to help
their fellow villagers who lagged behind to catch up. The economic elites’ fulfil-
ment of this kind of noblesse oblige has eventually become an important portfolio
of political credentials. In Q county, the major form of such help is through
employment, particularly managerial-level jobs in private enterprises. Villagers
hired as managers gain, in addition to the extra income, useful knowledge and
managerial skills. In addition, entry-level employment – including student intern-
ship and apprenticeship – can benefit the village youth, for whom the lack of
necessary training is a major obstacle preventing them from taking manufactur-
ing jobs in the booming Chinese cities. By providing career training as well as role
models for the village youth, private entrepreneurs are generally well respected
and supported by the younger constituencies.
35 See Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village; Burns, Political Participation in Rural China.
36 See Shue, The Reach of the State.
37 The motivations behind the donations varied. At times they involved governmental pressures; on other
occasions entrepreneurs found business potential in some welfare programmes. But the different reasons
for donation did not prevent the villagers from acclaiming the contribution made by the economic elites
to the community’s general welfare.
38 Interview with county cadres (no. 2005-011-1).
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Successful early entrepreneurs in Q county have a particularly strong obli-
gation towards members of their extended family or lineage to share valuable
market information and knowledge. In some communities, the consequence of
this generosity is so remarkable that many households with the same surname
engage in the same business, or businesses that are supplementary to each
other, demonstrating the strong snow-balling and role-modelling effect of earlier
entrepreneurship.
Private entrepreneurs also fulfil their noblesse oblige by leading or supporting
resistance campaigns in the village. These collective actions include different
kinds of events from legal litigation to feud-based armed conflicts. In Q county,
the entrepreneurial elites usually make quite generous donations to campaigns
that concern collective interests; they also provide expert knowledge, take up lea-
dership roles and occasionally use their outside connections to win difficult bat-
tles. Beyond image-building within the local community, collective actions can
draw the attention of the local Party bosses to the entrepreneurial leaders’ signifi-
cant potential in mobilizing the masses, which can increase further the utilitarian
value for the party-state to co-opt these local leaders into the establishment.
Business collaboration with political authorities
Political capital for local economic elites can be generated from collaboration
with authorities in profitable business activities. For example, since the 1990s,
village governments in Q county have gradually leased out former collective
factories or the “reserved farming lands” (baoliu di保留地)39 to private entrepre-
neurs for a rent. By paying a portion of their annual profit to the village auth-
orities, the entrepreneurs enjoy full control over the newly acquired enterprises
and many dig their first barrel of gold in this form of collaboration.
Sometimes there is corruption in the form of bribery or “kick-backs” between
the entrepreneurs and the cadres in local industrial and developmental projects,40
but even without illegal benefits, such collaboration can become a process in
which entrepreneurs and the local political authorities build lucrative relation-
ships and mutual trust. This relationship will then play a decisive role in the
future selection of VPS.
The Motivations
Engaging in politics is always a costly enterprise. Why are the new economic
elites in Q county willing to take up the time-consuming – and at times
troublesome – duties in leading the CCP’s grassroots organizations?
39 Farming lands not allocated to individual households.
40 For discussions on corruption under partial reforms in China, see Jean C. Oi, “Partial market reform
and corruption,” in Richard Baum (ed.), Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China (New York &
London: Routledge, 1991); Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
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Rent seeking
From the interviews, the most compelling reason I found for the business owners
in Q county to accept political appointments remained economic interest. This is
particularly true for entrepreneurial elites whose business relies heavily on local
resources, or those who collaborate in joint developmental projects with local
authorities. Indeed, becoming the key leader in the CCP’s village organization
almost guarantees potential economic gains and business convenience. As one
entrepreneurial VPS explained,
You know, my factories and businesses are all here – right in this village. You have to deal with
the village government on a lot of fronts – land, environment, workers’ welfare… Before I took
over the VPS position, I had to waste a large portion of my time to deal with village cadres who
know nothing about my business. But now, the job is much easier and I can concentrate on my
developmental plans and on how to increase productivity. This is a win-win situation for both
me and the village.41
For business owners, political status also shaped their relationship with the
powerful local Party bosses. Serving as the principal Party cadre in the village
is the most effective way to nurture a close personal relationship with the impor-
tant cadres who have a say in numerous business-related affairs. Sometimes, this
relationship can evolve into a patronage network that serves as strong protection
of the entrepreneurs’ current and future economic interests.
Political ambition
A political post is a source of both identity and protection under authoritarian-
ism. Becoming VPS gives business owners the sense of being an integral part of
the system and satisfies their desire for participation in the “only power game in
town” which in addition concerns many of their interests. As one entrepreneurial
cadre put it: “In the past, private business owners did not belong to the commu-
nist system; we used to be the ‘outcasts,’ ‘others’ and the untouchables. Taking up
the VPS position is a way to confirm that we – as business owners – do belong to
the current political system. And this is important.”42
For rural economic elites who are ambitious enough to “fly even higher”
within the system, VPS appointment serves as the initial “access point.” For
many, serving as VPS is a convenient stepping-stone to the local People’s
Congress (PC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), membership of which can be crucial. For one thing, membership in
the local PC or CPPCC can protect one’s business and residence from unnecess-
ary governmental harassment; but more importantly, the local PC and CPPCC
provide safe forums for economic elites to express their opinions on important
policy issues and valuable opportunities to socialize with officials to whom
they would otherwise have little access. A 2006 survey conducted by the All
41 Interview no. 2005-015-001.
42 Interview no. 2005-106-001.
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China Federation of Industry and Business (Zhonghua quanguo gongshanglian中
华全国工商联) shows that private entrepreneurs all over China have a serious
interest in participating in national and local PC and CPPCC. Among the sur-
veyed business owners, 28.8 per cent listed “managing to get membership in
CP or CPPCC” as the “most urgent task.”43 For Q county’s new elites, serving
as VPS is an effective first step towards getting into the local legislative or con-
sultative body and towards their potential political influence on a larger stage.
Lineage interests
Another major incentive for the new economic elites to take up the VPS position
is the desire to safeguard lineage interests in the village power structure. This is
not necessarily related to feuds, although at times who occupies the key village
leadership post does make a huge difference in solving inter-lineage fights. A
more common scenario is that, in a village with multiple lineages, which lineage
wins the VPS post can eventually become an issue of collective dignity and wel-
fare. As one villager explained:
If someone from your “surname” wins the VPS position, it is an honour for the entire lineage ( jia
zu家族). In this place, people have a deep sense of lineage –when one family has a wedding, every
household with the same surname posts a sign of “happiness” (xi zi喜字) on their door. Lineage
solidarity indeed plays a role in village politics. If there is someone in our lineage with the potential
of becoming the head of the village, we will do whatever we can to put him in place.44
Therefore, pursuing the key CCP position is considered the entire lineage’s col-
lective endeavour and a successful businessperson in that lineage is hardly able to
resist the pressure from his or her extended family to accept it. In villages suffer-
ing from feud or factional disputes, the peer pressure is even more visible and
irresistible.
Social reputation
Embedded in the local communal networks, entrepreneurial elites also deem
social reputation as a compelling incentive to pursue the VPS position. In the
past, merchants and business owners were ranked low in the social hierarchy
led by literati officials and proletarian cadres. Ideologically, they were viewed
as the “immoral” force in Confucian teachings; and the systematic social and pol-
itical discrimination against the business-owner class was inherited by the Maoist
revolutionary egalitarianism after 1949. Market reforms since the 1980s substan-
tially improved private business owners’ political status, yet the socially con-
structed scepticism surrounding their moral character endured. The emerging
business elites usually have a strong incentive to gain political status as well as
social recognition after their economic success has been announced “glorious.”
43 See Zhongguo siying jingji nianjian (China Yearbook of the Private Sector 2004–June 2006) (Beijing:
Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 2007), p. 57.
44 Interview no. 2005-037-001.
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Serving as the chief cadre in the ruling CCP’s village branch is an act of “gaining
‘face’,” a boost of their social reputation and an indicator of the much-needed
moral recognition from the local community.
Conclusion
“Changes in the composition of political elites can provide a crucial diagnostic of
the basic tides of history.”45 The political rise of Q county’s new economic elites
in the Communist Party’s grassroots organizations reflects vividly the profound
political changes economic liberalization has set in motion in the post-Mao
Chinese countryside.
Compared to the outmoded “proletariat” cadres, the new entrepreneurial VPSs
in Q county are substantially different in a number of ways. First, they received
more formal education and usually have more of a salient knowledge of the mar-
ket than their proletariat predecessors. Technological know-how and managerial
skills are some of the most needed skills for China’s rural development and are in
short supply. The new VPSs are by nature “development oriented” and business-
friendly; in fact, many of them directly bring business capacity and potential into
their native community via regular infusions of opportunity, capital and talent.
Second, the new VPSs base their power on both Party recognition and commu-
nity approval. Differing from their predecessors, they count more on the prefer-
ence of their community when exercising power and making decisions. While
traditional communist cadres (the “local emperors”) protect community interests
at their own discretion without much consultation with the people they govern,
the new entrepreneurial leaders’ “localism morality” is much more
community-oriented and they rely more on communal support and democratic
procedures to complete various missions.
Third, with wide business connections with the outside world, the entrepre-
neurial Party secretaries usually have a more outward vision than their predeces-
sors, which drives them to be more inclined towards eradicating the relics of past
collectivism and reforming the existing systems of public service according to
market principles. In many villages governed by the entrepreneurial VPSs,
new welfare systems such as pooled medical insurance, mutual-aid credit union
and legal aid programmes are being created, which could improve the quality
of general welfare.
Fourth, although a few entrepreneurial VPSs maintain a suspiciously lucrative
relationship with the supervising political authorities through bribery, kick-backs
or other illegitimate benefits, many of them enjoy a more cooperative working
relationship with the local party-state based on the mutual trust accumulated
in business collaboration and their shared goal in developing the local economy.
At the community level, the “role-modelling effect” derived from the new VPSs’
45 Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 166.
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success in business activities, activism in public service and sophistication in med-
iating lineage relationships has also made their leadership more persuasive and
less coercive compared to that of the outmoded cadres, and consequently they
rely less on coercive means in carrying out unpopular national or local policies
such as family planning or funeral reforms. In Q county, leading by example
has proved to be more powerful and effective than coercion.
Market reform has exerted tremendous influence on the power configuration at
the grassroots level of the partially reformed communist polity in rural China.
Economic liberalization had not weakened the CCP’s mandate and relevance
as the most important political existence in the Chinese countryside, yet it gener-
ated sufficient societal dynamics for the CCP to transform its grassroots organ-
ization and leadership. Through the fast-pace recruitment of new economic
elites and the fading-out of the traditional proletariat cadres, the CCP strived
to re-strengthen its political foundation at the grassroots and re-build an alterna-
tive source of identity and political legitimacy that relies heavily upon its newly
minted entrepreneurial cadres’ moral authority derived from their economic suc-
cess, public spirit and community activism.
Confirming earlier studies,46 this article also demonstrates that Q county’s new
economic elites did not take over the rural political stage as a homogenous group
sharing a uniform belief, preference or identity; rather, the intrinsic varieties
among them shaped their paths to power. The six types of local entrepreneurial
VPSs discussed in this article – large business owners, local entrepreneurs with
lineage seniority, local professionals, private farm owners, former village cadres
and communal entrepreneurs – vary significantly in terms of their occupational
background, network resources and power base. Yet it was exactly this variation
that led to their diverse relationship with the party-state apparatus and eventually
determined the form and extent of their control over village politics. Instead of
exerting influence as a social group with strong solidarity, in Q county individual
members of the new economic elites are more inclined to use their own unique
social resources, informal connections and “wisdom” to enter the party-state’s
formal political structure, collaborate with the local Party bosses, gain communal
support and grab crucial leadership posts.
The overall adaptive transformation of the CCP from the very beginning of the
Deng era provided a favourable political context for the transformation of its
grassroots leadership. However, my findings show that the driving forces behind
the political rise of the new economic elites in Q county are mostly endogenous
dynamics, embedded within the traditional communal networks that have been
strengthened – rather than weakened – under the Dengist reforms. The entrepre-
neurial elites’ gradual take-over of the CCP’s grassroots leadership is indeed an
intricate and multifaceted process that involved the new forces unleashed by
economic liberalization, the overall adaptive transformation of the Party and
46 E.g. see Dickson, Red Capitalists in China; Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy.
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the re-invigoration of traditional village communities after the dismantling of the
people’s communes. Each component in this process is indispensable.
“Getting rich is not only glorious.” The combination of authoritarian political
control and market freedom provided China’s rural nouveaux riches the ideal set-
ting to channel economic power and political prestige via the helpful hands of the
reform-minded Communist Party. Economic reforms offered the new elites enor-
mous advantages, compared to the outmoded proletariat cadres, in the new
power game that opened a whole set of novel opportunities and possibilities to
them. The entrepreneurial elites’ shining business success, deep involvement in
local development, contribution to community welfare and collaborative
relationship with the political authorities have made them outstanding in the
new political arena where numerous post-reform forces compete for power. A
partially reformed communist polity with high community-oriented “localism
morality” provided China’s rural economic elites a rich reservoir of incentives,
resources and channels to transmit their economic might, managerial capacity
and personal wealth into moral right and tangible political power. This might
in turn enable them to play an even more salient role in China’s future political
development.
Appendix: Notes on Fieldwork
Fieldwork was conducted in Q county, Hebei province between July 2005 and
June 2006, in collaboration with researchers from the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS). Q county, which has 354 villages in total, was chosen
due to local contact and access. Within Hebei province, Q county is average in
terms of its economic growth, industrialization and private sector development.
Fieldwork included archival research at the county archives, face-to-face inter-
views with village residents and a questionnaire survey on the local political elites.
Interviews were conducted by the author and CASS researchers, without the pres-
ence of local officials (on our request). Helped by the County Civil Affairs
Bureau, survey questionnaires were distributed in person to the village Party sec-
retaries (VPS), directors of village administrative committees and chairpersons of
the village councils in all 354 villages. Eventually, 403 questionnaires were filled
and returned to us by mail. Respondents were specifically asked what position
they held in the village as well as their past official post (if any). Based on that
information, we identified 211 VPSs who responded to our survey. Other ques-
tions were asked about their age, education, year of obtaining Party membership
and year of appointment, as well as information on any available collective enter-
prises in the village, private sector development, village solidarity groups and
organizations, operation of public projects and social welfare programmes.
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